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On March 17, 2000, Secretary of State Madeleine Al-
bright addressed a crowd at the Omni Shoreham Ho-
tel in Washington saying, “In 1953, the United States 
played a significant role in orchestrating the overthrow 
of Iran’s popular Prime Minister, Mohammed Mossade-
gh. The Eisenhower administration believed its actions 
were justified for strategic reasons, but the coup was 
clearly a setback for Iran’s political development. And it 
is easy to see now why many Iranians continue to resent 
this intervention by America in their internal affairs.” 
While her statement was not an outright apology for US 
involvement in the coup, Secretary Albright’s address 
constituted the most contrite US position to date, nearly 
50 years after the establishment of the Iranian dictator-
ship. Still, the citizens of Iran were not satisfied with this 
weak excuse for the political upheaval instigated by the 
US in their country, of which they were still feeling the 
after-effects.
Dwight D. Eisenhower entered the presidency in 1953 
on the promise that he would continue the work of 
the previous administration preventing the spread of 
communism to other nations. His faithful adherence 
to this policy of containment led to the perception of a 
communist threat in Iran and subsequent measures to 
overthrow the popularly-elected government. However, 
what was perceived as communism was merely a na-
tionalist movement led by leftist politicians seeking to 
reform their country. Instead of preventing the spread 
of communism, Eisenhower’s use of the Central Intel-
ligence Agency (CIA) in overthrowing the government 
of Mohammad Mossadegh actually encouraged the 
evolution of a brutal, dictatorial regime that plagued the 
citizens for many years to come. The Iranian coup illus-
trates the excessive use of the CIA that characterized the 
Cold War grand strategy of containment. 
We examine the actions taken by the CIA in Iran and 
reveal their enduring legacy: how the Eisenhower ad-
ministration and the CIA brought down a democratic 
government and subjected the citizens of a country to 
years of dictatorial rule installed and supported by the 
Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm 
and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.” 
In April 1950, the containment policy expanded from simply 
diplomatic policies to include military action through NSC-
68, a secret document that emphasized a belief that the goal 
of the Soviet Union was to overthrow free institutions world-
wide. To enact the policies necessary to combat communism, 
the document states that a strong military is “an ultimate 
guarantee of our national security and an indispensable 
backdrop to the conduct of the policy of ‘containment’.” Be-
ginning the hyperbolic discourse on the subject of the Cold 
War, NSC-68 uses apocalyptic language to describe the issues 
between the Soviet Union and the United States, claiming 
the imminent destruction of the US and all Western civili-
zation should communism spread. Such language fueled the 
administration’s fervent commitment to containment and Ei-
senhower’s fears of communist expansion. 
Eisenhower’s preference for using covert action to combat the 
spread of communism is best expressed through the Doo-
little Report. To prevent congressional oversight of the CIA, 
Eisenhower appointed an oversight committee that reported 
directly to him. The chairman of this committee, James Doo-
little, authored an eponymous report echoing Eisenhower’s 
own beliefs that the United States should employ covert es-
pionage tactics to destroy enemies of the US.  Eisenhower’s 
tight control on the CIA suggested his intended course of ac-
tion: to use the CIA and covert tactics to combat the spread 
of communism by any means necessary. This was the case for 
the CIA-supported coups in Iran.
As seen throughout modern history, money and resources 
are common incentives for foreign government intervention. 
Such was the case regarding the United States’ interest in the 
affairs of Iran in the 1950s. The democratically-elected na-
tionalist leader Mohammad Mosaddegh instantly national-
ized Iran’s oil industry once he took office in 1951. Previously 
controlled by the British Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, this 
nationalization proved intolerable to the United Kingdom. 
The British refused to compromise and did not accept the 
compensation that Mossadegh offered for their lost access to 
resources. In October 1952, Mossadegh cut off all diplomat-
ic ties with Great Britain, Winston Churchill was re-elected 
Prime Minister, and Eisenhower was elected in the United 
States, setting up their opportunity to alter the Iranian situ-
ation.
The following month, representatives of British Intelligence 
met with members of Eisenhower’s administration to discuss 
a plan to assert influence in Iran. In retaliation for their lost 
oil resources, the British Intelligence representatives suggest-
ed joint political action to remove Mossadegh from power. 
In March 1953, Undersecretary of State Walter Bedell Smith 
determined that the United States government could no lon-
ger approve of Mossadegh’s nationalizing efforts. Massive 
demonstrations had taken place in Iran in support of Mossa-
degh, which were instigated mostly from the Tudeh Party in 
Iran, the predominant communist party. 
Associating Mossadegh with these communists, the US gov-
ernment approved a budget of one million dollars in April 
1953, to be used to put Mossadegh out of power by any means 
necessary. Through a series of political decisions, Mossade-
gh incited increasing United States opposition. He declared 
martial law and stripped the Shah of power. When the British 
finally agreed to a fifty-fifty split of the oil company, Mos-
sadegh instead demanded $50 million in damages. In turn, 
the British and the US selected General Fazlollah Zahedi to 
become their chief sup-
port for a coup against 
Mossadegh. 
The plan, known as 
TPAJAX, was to start 
with a smear campaign 
to diminish the power 
of Mossadegh within 
the country. The ba-
sic premise of the plan 
was simple: convince 
the Shah that the UK 
and the US supported 
him and wanted to pro-
tect Iran from the Soviet 
threat of communism, necessitating that Mossadegh be re-
moved from power. The CIA subsequently persuaded the 
Shah to choose Zahedi as the new head of government. If 
this plan was unsuccessful, the CIA would incite a military 
coup in order to place him in power. 
The US and Britain’s smear campaign proved successful due 
to their control of most of the Iranian newspapers and use 
of anti-Mossadegh propaganda. When the CIA carried out 
the lynchpin of its plan in August to arrest Mossadegh under 
orders of the Shah (who had been coerced into signing those 
agreements), he had been tipped off and was prepared. He ar-
rested Zahedi’s lieutenant and declared the orders of the Shah 
illegal. This wasn’t the end of TPAJAX, however. The CIA 
fabricated an interview with Zahedi and published the Shah’s 
orders in the Iranian press, defending the Shah’s actions. Ad-
ditionally, Eisenhower used paid agitators to violently break 
up the ongoing protests. On August 19th, 1953, Mohammed 
Mosaddegh was arrested at his home, and the Shah returned 
to Iran to rule.
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United States. We then examine the legacy of these actions, or rath-
er, the after-effects of CIA involvement, specifically how the United 
States’ placement of dictators in the country directly led to events such 
as the Iranian Revolution. While the popular narrative suggests Eisen-
hower altruistically sought to use covert action to protect the citizens 
of the third world from communism, his policies resulted in the es-
tablishment of dictatorships, including the oppressive, violent regime 
that plagued the citizens of Iran for decades.
Containment, the predominant policy of the Cold War, centered on 
the assumption that the Soviet Union sought to extend their empire, 
overthrowing political regimes that were hostile to their ideology. As 
George Kennan, the famous author of containment strategy, states: “it 
is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the 
Modern democracy in Iran - elections in 2009. 
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The story of the CIA-incited coup in 
Iran did not stop with Mosaddegh’s ar-
rest. There were many unintended con-
sequences of the intervention that came 
to light in the years following the coup. 
Immediately after the Shah returned to 
power, he began a reign of oppression 
and corruption. The Iranian Parliament 
was successfully destroyed by the coup, a 
fact Mosaddegh took advantage of by rig-
ging elections in his favor and appointing 
only ministers who most benefited him-
self. America continued to support the 
Shah’s regime, especially since it bene-
fitted from Iranian oil exports. The Shah 
sought to grow the Iranian army and 
viewed American ties as the means to 
achieve his goal. The United States gov-
ernment poured money into the country 
and supported the Shah’s secret security 
force. When President John F. Kennedy 
entered office in 1961, he recommended 
that the Shah introduce Western-based 
reforms in the country, such as industri-
alization and secularization.
Brewing protests and discontent came to 
a head in what is now called the White 
Revolution between 1960 and 1963, 
15 | Ex-Patt Magazine of Foreign Affairs
when many students could be heard 
shouting their nostalgic support for the 
Mossadegh government. The protests 
were violently quelled. However, their 
efforts resulted in the passage of some 
land reforms that especially benefitted 
the peasants. This supposed solution, 
however, ultimately failed and increased 
the rate of poverty and homelessness in 
the cities. 
The most obvious effect of the Shah’s re-
turn to power was the Iranian Revolution 
of 1978. With the White Revolution still 
on their minds, the citizens of Iran saw 
the Shah raise oil prices astronomical-
ly and witnessed their national leaders 
spending the money wastefully or simply 
pocketing it. In the wake of public anger 
over corruption, the Iranian Revolu-
tion of 1978 began. Violent fighting and 
strikes paralyzed the country between 
1978-79, and the Shah fled into exile, 
bringing into Ayatollah Khomeini power 
—the very same Islamic leader who was 
so incensed by the White Revolution.
In the case of Iran, the global communi-
ty witnessed an intervention that led to 
an increase in the very conflict they are 
trying so hard to combat today- Islamic 
fundamentalist extremists and terror-
ism. It must be realized that American 
intervention in Iran throughout the 20th 
century was the very catalyst that caused 
Khomeini to return to power. With the 
Iranian citizenry incensed by the Shah’s 
brutal regime, Khomeini made a trium-
phant return to his home country that 
had exiled him for more than 15 years 
due to his opposition to the Shah. Today, 
Khomeini is well known as the Iranian 
religious leader that instituted Sharia 
law and the modern Islamic Republic of 
Iran, in addition to serving as Iran’s lead-
er during the Iranian hostage crisis from 
1979 to 1981. 
